

Surprise + Violence in Crises

1964

Evidence in Cuba

Surprise

- 1) In Cuba, all private info pointed to a given hypothesis, whereas "public" info pointed to several (including true one).

[did refugee and agent reports differ?]

agents; photos, high-alt; ship photos; SI; Saw private statements, refugees

- 2) Moreover, past experience (not shared by public) contradicted inference from one type of weapon to the other, which public accepted.

- 3) Moreover, view of Sov caution, set of its perceived risks (US action, local vulnerability, — i.e. US capabilities — and advantage of Sov base)

~~BR~~ This led to high confidence in a particular (wrong)

Hypothesis: → <sup>a)</sup> public assertions of present state and predictions of future states → <sup>b)</sup> public commitments drawing a line and threatening action if SU went beyond. → <sup>c)</sup> no

plans or preparations to take action, (except private

also: warnings, which produced further

assurances from Dobrynin) → <sup>and</sup> willingness to accept

delays in coordination due to weather and due to

policies designed to avoid incidents.

High conf led to acceptance of constraints on Recon  
(weather, avoidance of incidents, avoid coupling flights over  
international waters only with overhead, minimize numbers),  
(assumed pace of committee consideration) led to  
slowing the flow of the only evidence taken seriously  
by top decision-makers, and the only evidence that would  
show missiles (besides agents; i.e. not S/I or private comm).

Meanwhile, (a) low prior prob, and (b) political sensitivity  
caused by leaks, opposition, and Admin statements (+ existence of  
"good" source of evidence believed reliable and sure to  
produce credible evidence in time), caused evidence

[When did ~~the~~ surprise — failure to foresee, failure to  
see — become probable? What decisions made it  
more probable?

Note that decisions on what to say and what  
to commit were not independent of prob that recognition  
would be delayed and come as a surprise.]



Info

contradicting predictions and tripping commitments to be examined specially critically, not published (unless confirmed by photos); + constraints slowing publication even of "hard" evidence (IL-28, HRBM); and meanwhile, flow of photos "necessary" to confirm other evidence had stopped.

[How did other countries react to Pres statements of 4, 13 Sept?]

[Bennington Report simply extrapolates JFK practice, without considering (may) reasons, costs, risks, effects alternatives; doesn't compare practice of Jagan, JFK, like over crisis.

Order + speed with which things are tested,  
L.F. is computed.

COCKING

Alert State  
+ Watchful

Concepts of linkage of crises:

One crisis — or "false alarm" — may cock system for later fast action when certain events are recognized; or it may put on safety.

At same time, it may reduce or raise chance of recognizing those events in given time, or on given data.

SAMs + buildup + heating cocked Admin. to react to recognition of missiles; but slowed recognition. [Cocking: increases conditional prob of certain actions in certain period given certain perceptions. Distinct from: effect on the prob. of receiving data leading to those perceptions, or of interpreting it.]

<sup>slow</sup> Lebanon crisis cocked US for Iraq conf.

Cuba cocked US for Berlin. } didn't trigger  
Hungary cocked us for Poland

NSC-68, SU A-bomb, etc. cocked US for Korea.



Frequency of surprise (see back of notebook):

WWI attacks  
WWII attacks

Note that Korea, Lebanon, <sup>(?)</sup>Quemoy, Sing, Cuba ...  
would all have been crises even if they had been  
foreseen (if we had wished to act); but they all  
"happened" to be surprises.

Then ask: how many similar events were not  
surprises — and were crises?

All the attacks were surprises. But  
many of the coups, deployments, etc. that were not  
surprises were not crises: U.S. didn't contemplate  
violence or radical move, or didn't act at all.

(Berlin Wall; Laos; Cuban buildup, SAMs, IL-28s,  
troops... ) .... (Sputnik?)

And some surprises were not crises: Wall, ~~Sputnik~~ (?)

Hyp: Surprise is "in practice" a necessary condition for crisis.

Crisis  $\Rightarrow$  Surprise

OR: ~~The~~ Conditions for Surprise — "bad predictions, models" —  
are productive of crises (and violence).  
perhaps, deception, secrecy



Surprise:

If intell. + politicians always extrapolate recent past experience, assuming "no change," high prob. that turning-points, changes of policy, transitions from, say, peace to war, friendliness to hostility, expansionist moves, will come at great surprise: esp. if they come at long intervals.

(in contrast to "other evidence," structural theories that imply change, call the turn, on basis of given data)

Also, refusal to consider beforehand "hypothetical questions" — What if ... K dies, K does this, alliance fails ... — may mean gov is "ready for anything," uncommitted — or may mean it is highly committed, inflexible, so far as ability to adapt to given, occurrence is concerned [the need to move fast in that direction — impossible under current policies — is not seen if that hyp is not considered].

Hyp:

When events come as surprises, likelihood of violent, radical response is increased: (from 0?!) )

2) Ominous possibilities are given higher weight;  
(Korea, Lebanon; Cuba;

b) Fear of surprise raises political stakes, since it appears as failure, stupidity; adds to urgency (+ need to distract public)

c) Nonviolent, non-radical, effective alternatives not at hand (violent ones may be, if "cocked"), no time to evolve them;

d) Forces inhibiting violence or shift don't have time to express themselves (situation appears urgent); allies, public opinion (Hyp: their taste for violence diminishes with familiarity, time).

e) Anger at deception, political loss, foolishness.

f) Commitments to violence that would have been made without surprise.

Much then depends on whether victim can move violently fast: depends on cocked position, but also motivation (3, b, d, e), willingness to "start half cocked" (Korea).



When events which — as surprises — would evoke violence are foreseen : 2) great effort to deter or prevent them (e.g. by coercion)  
3) acceptance of them without violence:  
preparation of public, alternative responses.

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Crisis as "Failures to Communicate" (WWI;

(Rather: 1) efforts to deceive

2) failures to convince :  
conflict → evident motives to deceive, exaggerate  
ambiguity of signals

contrary signals, evidence

uncontrolled, opposing evidence or theories

failure to catch attention

~~was~~ wrong interpretation by opponent  
noise

3) inability to predict (as well as an observer)  
one's own probable reaction; or to know one's  
vulnerabilities, lags, etc.

4) effects (or many views) of one's internal conflicts

(This explanation is popular when one's actual response seems, afterwards, "obvious & inevitable.")

What influenced K — broad nature of our response, or style, timing, widest intent — & what gave JFK that intent? Was that inevitable?

Hyp: Surprise based:

1. Urgency: feeling that <sup>2</sup>"something must be done", or may have to be done; 2) "right away."

In confused, shocking situation, less confidence that inaction will not, in short run, lead to terrible outcome. Events are out of control

(or: one is not confident of ability to control); dominos are falling (Bowen); risk of bad outcome fast rises high above normal



## 2) Consideration of violence:

- a) Can take effect fast, be started fast
  - b) Satisfies need to "do something" quickly, not appear passive, undecided (Libanon?)
  - c) "justified" by ominous possibilities
  - d) May be effective (in contrast to others)
  - e) Satisfies anger, humiliation at deception, if any; saves face; returns "challenge."
- By upholding immorality, ungratifiability of opponents' action, it ~~to~~ implies unpredictability

3) Perception of urgency, threat, breeds secrecy, small number of decision-makers, non-consultation in preparing response; hence, less inhibition to violence.

[But Wall? Contemplation of our own commitment disposed us to inaction? Like U-2 now?]

[Analyze Berlin 1961 as contrast to most drops on crises. Laos? Berlin Autobahn incidents?] <sup>publicly</sup> consultation;  
Berlin: No surprise; deliberate + effective commitment; no deception;

If you want decision-maker to take violent act  
if E occurs: 1) get him to commit, while he  
regards  $pr(E)$  as low

This works if enemy keeps  $pr(E)$  low by  
sneaky + deception till it ~~seems~~ he produces E; and  
if it doesn't take too long for E; and if E is not  
only a surprise but produces political risks (e.g. deception);  
does harm and can be shown to have ominous  
implications, need for fast action, no consultation.

But: without these conditions, commitment may not  
only not produce response: it may produce  
timidity, fear of own response, esp. if enemy  
manipulates this. (Berlin Wall? Munich?

U-2 now?); willingness to concede, to avoid  
challenge, to "escape from box," "untie hands."

i.e. pinning a commitment on Pres that he comes

✓ to want to escape from can be costly.



The expectations that lead to surprise seem often to rest on inferences / assumptions about the predictions the opponent will make as to one's own responses to his possible actions (and, his attitude / response to his predictions).

Often, it is assumed opponent makes the same predictions we would make, i.e. we do make: ~~exp. of~~ we regard this as validated (Kent) if we do make the response we would have predicted.

Yet our doing that doesn't mean that that was a uniquely reasonable or even "good" prediction on basis of given premises: e.g. putting missiles in Cuba. It does mean our response was possible, and that details of execution of Sov move may have mattered (i.e. made our response probable).

It certainly doesn't mean we must expect Sovs to make same prediction.

What data available to K do we expect to influence his decision? Immediate JFK statements? Congress, columnists? Or, Marx; Bay of Pigs, Laos?

Surprise ~~leads to~~ increases prob of ("action") (vs. inaction), violent action (inappropriate action), inappropriate violent action.

(If all you want is action, or violent action, then surprise is good)

also raises prob of inappropriate inaction

What goes down? Appropriate non-violent action?

(Instigator bets on inappropriate inaction - paralysis; he accepts risk, or ignores, or underestimates prob of fast, violent action (and consequences for him, and his likely response to it) - which therefore comes not only as a disappointment but a surprise.)

Instigator doesn't foresee degree of provocation

(and even victim lacks good theory of "what will provoke him - to fast, radical, violent action. He doesn't only fail to address it, foresee it).



One can't rule out that "more info" will lead to worse judgment than having a subset of that info. (e.g. a big sample may be further from "true" value than a small sub-sample; with assumption of random sampling, this is increasingly unlikely.

But suppose that systematically, in some kinds of situation "Insiders' opinion will be worse than Outsiders.

e.g. when Opponent engages in deception; especially over private channels (or, when private channels are less equivocal, usually).

or, when private channels provide strong evidence of current pattern, & evidence of stability: gov will but more heavily on stability than public — perhaps much more heavily (expressively); which looks bad at turning-point.

(Gov could aim at calling turningpoints; or try to ~~predict~~ estimate likelihood of change.)

Knowledge leads to commitments, which can lead to greater losses when environment changes (or, "bad luck").

If gov didn't bet, it wouldn't make big losses;  
but small losses might kill nation.

But gov action is compared to the inaction  
that public ignorance would have led to; or,  
gov failure to hedge is compared against insurance  
public would have bought in this case — though  
buying this insurance in every case would use up all  
resources.



Crisis: There may be a great difference  
between consequences of Action Now vs.  
Action a little later; i.e. between  
long- and short-run consequences of short-run inaction  
and action now.

Thus, there may be great losses to postponing  
action moderately: unlike normal conditions.

Critical time, deadline; discontinuity in effects of  
vs. inaction  
action<sub>x</sub> as it moves along time-axis.

~~Bill Stacey~~ 1964

## C-II NOTES

### COMM in Crises

1. Offensive - defensive "conversation."
2. Statement of commitment by JFK.  
(Statements on Berlin by K)
3. What US acts had been intended to communicate to K?  
What info did he probably draw from them?

(Receiver, if he sees signal as a message,  
gets perception of: a) intended meaning to receiver  
(effect which sender wishes to achieve on  
R's selective process, readiness, etc.).

b) other meaning, info (perhaps undermining (a).)

There may also be effects on R of which R is  
not consciously aware; these may or may not have  
been intended by S. (other info, setting)

All of these depend on context, & R (with  
his past experience!).



1. Resistance to types of missiles was strong & active from mid-August on: not just a passive "filter." — in face of reports, guesses, data.
2. When was McCone suspicion?
3. <sup>(changes)</sup> Impact of politics on dissemination of info within govt; freedom to speculate. Effect on middle-level staff work.
4. Was island-wide nature of SAM defense — as compared to a limited-area defense — misleading? (Suppose defense had been more "efficient" — to protect SO military bases — would this have been more revealing? How about actual later pattern?)

5. Examine attitude that OS can afford to wait till  
"hard" evidence is in — till photos are received.

(note effect of weather delays; shootdowns; )

How were payoffs, possible findings, types of SU installation,  
possible responses evaluated in Sept, in relation to  
data-gathering and response processes?

Were plans revised as a result of  
continued "bad luck" on weather, postponing of  
flights?

(finding out: recon)

(Compare McN delay in talking to Thorngroft.)

Having decided to do something "as soon as possible"  
is response changed when long delays actually occur?

Effect of preconceptions (+ costs of recon) on the  
motivation to "find out."

E.g. was "hard evidence" needed before restrictions  
on U-2 coverage were lifted?



Effect of weather:

- 1) High requirement for good weather (low cloud coverage)  
— because of risks, desire to "max info."
- 2) Cover over parts of island being aimed at  
(even if weather was clear elsewhere?)
- 3)

Who wanted more flights, other flights, more risks  
in Sept-Oct? How strongly?

How ~~was~~ prob, effects of U-2 shootdown evaluated?

Conflict?

McG didn't inform JFK till 9am, 16 Oct. (after

meetings 15 and earlier on 16 Oct took place.) What

did JFK think of that? When was JFK night of 15 Oct?

When did Sorenson know? Who did JFK want

told who didn't yet know? When Jackson, South?  
Nudge? (8pm 18th - Thursday)

(Johnson, Dillon, Bobby (not told earlier?), Sorenson —  
James, etc

11:45 meeting). (Baker, Thompson, Stevenson at meeting at State, afternoon).

Had any been told that JFK would not have included?

Were MRBMs thought to be <sup>possibly</sup> operational on 16 Oct?

Were they?

How reliable was estimate of alert condition,  
operational status?

If missiles had been found ready, and had been  
attacked: play from there. (Allies, public, SO) (Admin)

(What would have been effect of speeding up decisions?)

earlier decision? Strike? (On basis of early photos —

how confident were people that effort needed was small?)



Note cover provided by our officer PHIBRIGLEX G2

Might JCS, by increasing "military" nature of strike,  
have increased prob of using it?

Focus on Cuban civilian casualties. How much worry  
about low casualties?

What meetings did Nelson participate in?

Taylor - JCS link? Timing, adequacy. Presentation of  
JCS views?

Why not include Castro in blame?

Because blockade would have to start at higher level -  
to put pressure on Cubans. (But why? Purpose of  
blockade was not to "put pressure on" anyone. What  
was goal of blockade? What were hopes?)

Monday, JFK: importance of not saying that attack or  
invasion had been considered but rejected.

(Effect of this on meaning of blockade).

[What did commanders in Turkey & Italy do to ensure  
no firing?]

[What planning was done for retaliation on SU if  
a Cuban missile were fired? Problems?]



Analyze Cuban venture as "provocation."

What conditions were necessary for us to be "provoked" into action? Compare it as "provocation" to other potential SU actions (e.g. missiles in SU; )

What did the crisis feel like: at different points, to different people? (Macmillan: greatest strain of life).

Any controversy over handling of Budapest, Thursday morning? [Wed night]

When/how did JFK learn of "accidental" U-2 overflight.

How much of RAND tone, approach, style, has been determined by fact that in '50's only customer & audience for ideas was the military : approach was adapted to (attack, <sup>but mostly</sup>) this prejudices, values, preconceptions.

(Note AWW lecture of

It was not, originally, adapted to the ~~values~~ opposite, civilian values, etc., of OSD, W. H., or public.

(Lack of emotion, "humanitarian" values, because it was necessary to suppress these in selling ideas that really did, in part, reflect them.

Also, focus on R&D, posture, weapons systems; arguments for strategizing, buying, developing — i.e., not high-cost or high-risk actions, — not arguments for or against declaring, committing, threatening, attacking: For operations.



## Offense / defense

This distinction was introduced in intell. ests. starting (?) <sup>on Cuba</sup>  
in Jan '62. <sup>§</sup> Was any planning / policy thought given  
to <sup>1)</sup> threat posed by <sup>2)</sup> improved defenses

b) symbols like I<sup>1</sup>-28%, M/Gs, etc.

c) Saw imminent

d) troops committed ?

2) possibility / desirability of preventing this ?

3) What was Admin. est. of the political costs of  
accepting defensive build-up ? Was it right ?

4) How would election have been influenced by accepting  
missiles ?

Surprise

Zeckhausen: Isn't it surprising that 90% of  
surprise parties are surprises?

(People would not have thrown them  
if they didn't expect them to be surprises).



(1)

Thomas D

White: Sateurpost, May 4 '63

In common with many other military men, active & retired, I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional "defense intellectuals" who have been brought into this nation's capital. I don't believe a lot of these often overconfident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians and other theorists have sufficient worldliness or motivation to stand up to the kind of enemy we face.

(War is a brutal, dirty, deadly affair. Our enemy is a coarser, crooked megalomaniac who aims to kill us. Expectations to the theory that brute force, not theory, wins wars are so rare-

This small fraction arose because <sup>a)</sup> in most operations the staff themselves got the right answers, <sup>b)</sup> or because there was not enough factual data of past operations to extrapolate from, <sup>c)</sup> or because the operations proposed by the staffs were too novel to allow realistic predictions of the likely results. It is thus clear that the work of the operational research groups was an addition to, and not a substitute for, the exercise by the trained staffs of conventional military wisdom.

[In b) & c) - or (2) - did operations do worse?] ]



Blackett: Encounter April '61

When I come to study in detail some of the arguments of these new military writers about nuclear war, I will necessarily have to adopt many aspects of their own methods and terminology, that is, I will have to meet them on the methodological ground of their own choosing. I want therefore to apologize in advance for the misleading influence of much of what I will have to say."

mega-death...

I think the influence of the Theory of Games has been almost wholly detrimental. (Schelling)

One of the most important lessons which the war-time operational research groups had to learn was that there were only a few problems, perhaps only 1/10, which could add something useful to the decisions arrived at by the trained Service Staffs through the exercise of their traditional military judgment and wisdom.


(Orwell)



Kinney

S-2174

K 2120



Kahn: Decisions that are well-meaning, informed, intelligent, and thoughtful may not succeed in avoiding disasters; they may even contribute directly to disasters. Nevertheless, it would be much worse to be malevolent, ignorant, stupid or thoughtless. If there is no guarantee that even our best will be good enough, we can hardly afford to do less.



Kane : The

See: DA memo, Recon Program in Cuba. to SecDef

## C-II Study 1964

Was our main reaction to buildup, attempts in Oct to get other countries to deny overflights & restrict shipping, and close <sup>US</sup> ports to all ships of any country when any ship carried arms (protested by Greece) (all protested by Greeks, K), so as to make SC buildup "as difficult and as expensive as possible."  
(Were we messing OAS — like public, etc.?)

[Similarities to Surge: Was JFK attitude to K almost like a because of (a) nuclear responsibility, (b) communication ally, expected to tell us the truth, warn us, not screw Admin — esp. in timing, while K, like Eden, expected ~~for~~ JFK to protest, act ineffectively, but accept privately, with SC reassurances as to intent?

Did K expect this to be the end of the "Special Relationship"?

Note: K's acting contrary to expectations raised on various questions



See Cairo Embroid 710, Row 6

Kennedy-Nasser, Nasser-K correspondence  
(not published)

[What lessons did K, SU draw from Cuba?

Not to try to produce a fait accompli? Or,

~~designer~~ How not to produce a fait accompli?

(i.e. one bad way) ]

Rusk - Kohler Nov 28

Our position is that of a reasonable man whose strength + restraint have both been demonstrated.

[Private channel may have suggested to K:

1) JFK's concern with avoiding having his hands bound by public opinion, prestige, may have made K disbelieve that JFK would let himself be bound.

2) JFK had made clear that public attitudes could not be identified with those of USG.

US

Reasons for avoidance of formal diplomatic (ambass.)

channels: 2) Have to brief French, Brit, German...

R-Koh Nov 28

Pres is dubious about possibility of carrying out really useful exchanges with Sovs if we follow usual procedure of full briefings for them and then for NATO. In part, this has led to either to leaks and public discussion of Allied differences before reactions of Sovs have been ascertained, or to debate with Alliance on theoretical points <sup>which</sup> [?] have played no role in talks with Sovs.

[~~The~~ Do Allies also have "private channels" to R ?]



Blockade  
Issues / proposals in first week:

- II:
- 1) Privately tell K and Castro
  - 2) get OAS backing before acting
  - 3) ~~get~~ after OAS backing, call special session of Congress to declare war.
  - 4) after Congress acts, impose blockade (to prevent further introduction of missiles;  
<sup>SU</sup>  
(reaction "could well be" blockade of only US forces in Berlin)).

(Thus for legal & political reasons, make blockade within framework of formal declaration of war & OAS sanction)

Plan I: limited One-time strike (50 sorties) against known MRBM sites

1) Simul. message to K, tone "more sorrow than anger."

Underline Pres shock, K assurances, Pres statements;  
limited action (would repeat as necessary), low-level  
recon Call for bilateral summit on all issues.

[ Could we have repeated? - Could we have  
continued recon? If not - would they have kept  
other MRBMs? If we had waited, <sup>not consulting?</sup> ~~to find~~ + get  
all missiles, could we have justified strategy?

Cf. July: effects of slow, sequential attack &  
alliance/public reaction, + SU threats ]

[Cf. effects of not carrying out threat to repeat ]

Would justify not consulting, fast action, by need to  
assume that the missiles would not become operational.

[What if they already had been? How important was  
this really to EntComm? Why? : a) fear of Cubans, accident;  
b) fear of Pearl Harbor; c) dangers of hitting them later; d) Psych bonus to  
K - in Berlin - of having them operational? Did SU anticipate this?]



[Would this have been good time for summit:  
with prob. Allied reaction?

Low response: Possible that in view of the speed  
with which the attack could be concluded, might pass  
as relatively minor incident. In that event, K could  
treat it as of no more importance (!) than his  
own shooting down of our U-2 in 1960. On the  
other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that he  
would find it necessary to make a military response  
against Berlin or possibly Turkey.

[Who thought this? Note power of thinking on another  
crisis: Was that crisis understood by proponents?]  
How does this "possibility" look now?]

While there might be some disposition on part of certain  
NATO countries to suggest an ipso facto analogy to Suez, the  
fact that US was compelled to act quickly to prevent the  
missiles from becoming operational would tend to blunt the  
indignation that might result from failure to undertake prior consult.



2)  
Along with Pres participation comes White House  
participation — of people ~~not~~ so experienced in  
foreign affairs, crises. Note Hughes on Suez.

+ PSALM  
b) ExComm phenomenon (Oct 15-22) means

release of principals from staffs (as at Nassau) —

+ subsequent, further distance of principals and  
staffs in life and personal commitments.

Surprise

On 10 Aug, McE emphasized possibility that SO would justify their action by ref. Turkey & Italy.

Did we underestimate their est. of the value of this justification, in determining US response?

How well would ExCom members have predicted their own response, whatever it was? (e.g. Nitze...)

# C-ICARISTS NOTE 8 64

Events: Aug 22, '63 History

[How sure was K that we would attack?

What made him that sure?

How surprising was blockade? JFK speech?

How worried was he on 23 Oct? Would blockade ~~have~~ have worried him?

[If SA-2 shootdown of U-2 was unauthorized — how much did it worry K? JFK?

If U-2 overflight was unauthorized, how much did it worry JFK? K? ]

[Black Box problem: Why did nations take the observable actions they did? Under what circumstances would they act the same — or different?

Not enough data, experience for input-output study — besides, inner structure changes. So, read look at the works.]

WHAT ARE SIGNIFICANT (surprising) OUTPUTS OF THE PRES?



[Did SU think that "the problem" was to get  
some missiles on island — not, deployed —  
prior to detection? Explain difference in SU move  
to Cuba, US move to Turkey; why didn't latter create  
crisis? What conceivable act might we do?]

Would SU think it important to ~~get~~ postpone  
detection by a few days or weeks — once they were  
there? What if they had — so that our first  
look showed ready missiles?

Why would readiness have made us willing to attack?

How important is supporting our response was a US  
feeling that Turkish missiles were rather intolerable  
to US, indefensible?]

Missile reports in August: either linked to SAMs or  
Cruise, or shown incorrect.

[Were there false alarms in Aug-Sept  
from intell. analysts, as well as refugees?]

Suggestive reports after mid-Sept:

1) specific zone in Pinar del Rio heavily guarded  
by Sows, Cubans denied.

prior  
noise? { 2) oral comments by Castro aide: we have ... IRBM ~~capa~~  
3) " " " : have atomic weapons.

4) sighting of truck convoy with what looked like MRBMs.

Early Sept. restrictions on dissem, based on DC/ instruction ✓  
that ~~if~~ there should be greatest possible photo relief.

Aug 31 - Sept. restriction on results of 29 Aug flight.

Early Oct - Oct 11. restriction on IL-28's.

Oct 12<sup>-22</sup>: special class. system.

[Source: "crate analysis" Sept joint after mid-Sept; Sept 13 speech]

[Dynamic pattern? Early stage of potential crisis

→ "tension", fear of 'incidents' that would heighten tension + raise prob of crisis (not yet believed to be high) → constraints on 3) info-gathering

(U-2, recon; ship movements) → delayed recognition of problem, increased impact of "surprise"

and on 6) alert, readiness -

[What if SAMs had been operational, & even threatened, prior to Oct 14! & consider dependence on photos.]

→ decreased readiness, flexibility

→ increased vulnerability

Both increase chance of a fait accompli

[Anyone aiming at a fait accompli can & should aim at these effects. Have they?]

[Yet, if incident does occur, consider effect of that on 2) recon, 6) readiness -

<sup>Sept 8?</sup> U-2 over China; U-2 over Sakhalin <sup>Sept Aug 30?</sup>

WHAT IF THESE HAD HAPPENED PRIOR TO AUG 29?

(Might have seen SA-2's 40 feet; but might have taken agent reports more seriously: maybe on overflight, say, Sept 20!)



[Note consequence of last flight being first when it was — not later or sooner!]

[What would have been difference of less stringent constraint on cloud cover?]

Sept 10: See State objection to Carter flight plan: extensive peripheral + overflight (east + central, Borneo) <sup>to look for</sup> more SAMs.  
instead 4 flights, 2 over.

[Why no proposal to look again at west end?  
Assumption on speed of installation?] [SAMs?]

[Was mission on 10th cancelled? Why?][When?]

Flight for 16th: <sup>over NE</sup> delayed then cancelled for weather. Over Paris:

17 Sept: unusable photos. 18-21: cancelled for weather.

Not flown unless weather good. 4 hours before takeoff.

Between Sept 5 — Oct 14, 5 scheduled missions cancelled for bad weather over target; one other flown, but obscured.

[Did ~~Board~~ Committee force this problem?]

Mission intended to cover Borneo from 22-26

Flight program completed Oct 7.

Next step: overfly SA-2 to find out if operational (?)

From 18 Sept - Oct 2, reports created suspicion among analysts of NABMs west of Havana.

(not "published"?)

[Why not checked out immediately?]

Flight planned on Oct 9 to cover both.

Oct 4: McC argued for extensive overflights.

[When did his suspicions start?] Special Group requested study (by NAREcon Off, JCS, CIA) of alternative means of recon, because of increased risk; meeting on Oct 9 to hear report (see ?); planned flight: bad weather on 10-13 Oct.

[Why does C4 plane create issue of overflying international waters, but SAC peripheral mission does not?]

[How did weather on Oct 14-22 — 20 missions flown — compare to NAREC Oct 2-14?]



among

Informed Oct 15: McN; Kilpatrick; Carroll; Taylor;  
Bark; Bell; Johnson; Martin; Hilsman; McE;  
Carter; Bundy. [Nitzge?]

Johnson? Kasper, Kover?

[ Bobby? Loomison? Who else was actually told? ]

What did they do? Think about? Feel? First  
responses? Did they know or expect JFK to be told?

Order? Time? Why tell them but not JFK?

How unusual was this?

Thompson?

At first meeting, were Johnson, Abraham, Nitzge, South there?

What decisions, other than now or never? Org? Responses?

[What can be inferred about responses if news had  
been different?]

[ "If photos had revealed open missiles in alert, with  
warheads — immediate air attack might well have  
been ordered." Johnson — would have been, without doubt.

[Why? How come?]



Wednesday: meeting without Pres (who left in afternoon):

One of first suggestions (who?): treat like U-2 in 1960.

("should" have been treated): a "mistake" to be "erased."  
"extremely"  
by limited air strike.

[Could <sup>VCS</sup> we have? How fast? How?] ]

[Did K prob. think that operational status of weapons  
would influence us — that early discovery would make  
us more willing to act?] ]

Rhetorical (?) question (who?): Why not just accept  
missiles? (NOTE: this would support our retention of  
IRBMs in Turkey, if we wanted that! Any motion?) ]

[Our position on Cuba reduced prob. of keeping Turk  
bases; any prediction of this?] ]

[But access to Oral History interviews or tapes on Cuba.] ]

Early estimate of strike (WHOSE?): 50 sorties, 75 bombs for MRBMs; another 100 sorties for airfields; 200 for SAMs. Invasion needed 2000 sorties, 4000 bombs.

Thurs Pres: <sup>morning</sup> 2 groups, "slow" + "fast." [WHO?]

[Cuba not formal ally of Soviets; no blockade...]

JFK decision: <sup>of opinion? MRBMs</sup> ~~Assessment~~ could not be accepted.

Thurs. aft: without Pres.

Re. air strikes: danger to other countries; to Montanans;  
moral point of striking without warning, particularly as  
it bore on the inevitable (?) Cuban civilian casualties.

[Any thought to demonstration attack?] [Cham?]

[JCS opposed this on 16 Oct]

Blockade regarded as more workable, provocative,  
than limited air strikes against missiles alone. (O-2 1960)

[How does that look now?]. Johnson had called

blockade "act of war" on Oct. 6. But small  
attack looked like "incident": [decide by harassment?]

U-2 shootdown. [Really?] Requinto first looked  
small. Says "might not choose to make an issue." [! ?]

(Thursday)  
Wednesday photos: more missiles.

Tried to blockade.

Thomoko at 5: "sincere hope" of his country for  
settlement of German question; unfortunate no progress on  
Berlin.

[No threat on Berlin — as reported?]

G. instructed to make it clear mid to Cuba was solely  
for the purpose of contributing to the defensive capability  
of Cuba [not, defensive purpose?].

OFK: no threat of invasion to Cuba; would have been  
glad to give assurances to that effect if K had asked:

[So: guarantee was no new concession?]

G: Saw specialists in Cuba were giving training in handling  
certain kinds of defensive arms [they were operating  
MRBMs, SAMs]

[Johnson, Did G know we knew? Phil Dobrynin did not  
know.]



Friday night: both lines of action (blockade + large strike) "was gained," at State + Defense. (How? WHO?)

Thompson worked on paper for Pres.

W. Bundy paper also worked.

First draft of speech written by Stevenson. (see)

Sat. morning: Johnson scenario discussed (see)  
(Adelson?)

Pres: 2:30. Everybody, with Stevenson, Thompson, Lovell.

Airstrikes: large; almost certainly have to follow  
with invasion (?); Carbon civilian casualties would  
be high. Hardly conceivable loss would not respond  
militarily. SEE JFK: plan as presented was "not surgical,"  
was "apt to grab" (~~not~~?) require massive commitment

Quarantine was "only course of action compatible with  
our principles. Only a small risk this would "pull the  
lanyard."

// Evening: JFK talked to Gore; later, to McNamara.  
(Neustadt: got this)

No bargain on basis, Bomber loss of problem.

If construction continued, might be necessary to strike sites, minimum basis; unlikely SU would retaliate, esp. since SAC alert.

If <sup>when</sup> surviving minutes were used against US, it might be necessary to invade, but not to use nukes against Cuba; however, it might be necessary to make a compensatory attack vs. SU.

[Any planning? Analyze!]

Sunday morning:

Till 10, when final approval to plan, possibility we would open with strike.

2:30 NSC, with Anderson. (after decision!)

[How common was "scenario" approach? Did

A. Johnson invent this?

Monday

11:30 mtg. of Excom  
Pres - message to Jupiter.

3: formal mtg. of NSC (McDonnell)

established Excom. avoid appearance of disunity;  
sing one song.

Importance of not saying strike or invasion had been  
considered (& rejected):

Why no guarantee earlier? Lack of "hard" evidence  
to convince allies; & opinion of experts that SU  
missiles were unlikely.

Note: Congress reaction — air strike, invasion.

(vs. Taylor, McN first view?!)

Macmillan reply to Bruce briefing, 6 Monday: it must rest  
not so much on precedent as on unprecedented condition of  
the modern world in a nuclear age.

Must be ready for retali. action against Berlin, as well  
as pressure on weaker parts of the Free World defense system.



Monday night:

[Find out: Rusk - DeLozier talk, 22 Oct.]  
- thoughts,

10:40-11:45 McN and Anderson.

and briefing on nuclear weapons. (?)

Tuesday morning:

Rusk to Ball: We've won a considerable victory;  
you and I are still here. [ Did Rusk believe this? ]

[Munstedt: Bundy & JFK did not; issue was  
not immediate Holocaust, but shipping road.]

[Why did SO persist in denying presence of missiles?]  
[What did this "convey" to us?]

Excomm: 10: 3 subcommittees. Berlin, advance planning,  
comm.

Nitze: comm for inter-allied relationships.

check with hsr

Advantages of not telling allies: they would not be able to tie our hands, & would be free to divorce themselves.

*in Nitze's comm.*

Fear that Mao would phone JFK to urge against some course of action.

(Owen?)

Tuesday: Memo for JFK (via Post): Taylor, Talbot & Postons

urges support for MRBMs to Europe; privately urge Jinks to plan out Jupiter as soon as MLF---- available? prohibitably? Agreement by Great Powers to desist from deploying MRBMs to Caribb. or ME (but, MLF?)

SEE

7 pm Proc. of Introduction

8 pm MCN said 25 Sov ships enroute to Cuba,

their course unchanged [TRUE?]

in past 24 hrs.



Friday morning: 10: 2pm (with Stevenson). (Adrian?)

Work on minutes continuing. E. [Plot fever chart of Sov crisis]. Air strike dismissed.

Sovs still probing.

Deal of Fomin + Scali; distinctly under UN supervision;  
pledge by Castro not to accept offensive weapons (?)  
in Cuba; pledge by US not to invade.

Scali, Vilspan, Rusk (Chet: Sonnenfeldt?)

Scali - Fomin 7:45: real possibilities. true short.

Also, failures at UN and by Sov. Ambassadors to Sholomisev.

[W4V?]

Letter began writing at 6; had been translated  
by US Env in Moscow. [so, not influenced by Scali]

Letter: if answered by Pres, and if fleet recalled, this would  
immediately change everything.... Also too, the question of the  
destruction, not only of the amounts which you call offensive,



but of all other armaments as well [!] would look different."

If assurances were given by the Pres. and the gov. of the US that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleets, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the gov. of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, the armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

... Let us therefore slow statismalike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for

Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the US will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support the any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Spears recovered at 10 pm to discuss.

Agree to treat as bona fide offer. Drafting an reply at State and WH. (No mention of Berlin, or Turkey; though, no explicit offer to remove; suggested Castro's consent needed; asked guarantee of Cuban security — difficult domestically for US)

[Did Ritz, Rostow know?]



Thursday

10 pm : Pres.

SO accountable. OS must act, but "we have too much self-respect to respond by an act of aggression."

JFK: tentative decision to blockade, announce Monday.

Directed detailed planning.

Friday: Pres on tour.

Acheson returns to talk of air strike. Discussion.

("although tentative Pres decision" ?

Decided to keep option open by having staff work done on both. [Bundy ? JFK?]

[Neustadt = JFK didn't believe blockade would be enough; wanted Bundy to keep "others" from preempting his decision by freezing planning on strike.]

[Acheson, via RW: JFK then "reverted" by military plans that actually emerged; turned away from strike, military, + Acheson.]



Sat morning:

Excom at 10. Discussing draft reply [check]

Meadell, Radio Moscow letter: offer to remove;

Tudy; inspection.

Meadell (check time): U-2 shot down.

U-2 overflying. (Sov fighters scrambled). Within hours,  
fire on plane. Castro vowed to shoot down plane.

[S412 system] [when ?]

Hopes dashed.

[When: JFK attacks on Nitze, Bundy]

Decision by Pres: pick out of earlier letter basis for  
solution. Ignor rest.

Excom at 4: consider proposal replies.

2 planes find on. Pres. approved two messages to K.

Letter sent at 8:05 pm.

late that night, message to Faltetter: call NAC.

Excom at 9: discussion of additional steps next day: such  
as POL blockade, mobilizing US merchant ships (?) or a possible air strike.